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Technology, Commerce, Development, Identity 
Andrea M. Matwyshyn* 
Traditional paradigms of technology regulation ask how 
technology-mediated space1 is different from non-technology 
mediated space.  Regulation rarely focuses on how technology 
makes a user develop differently than she/he otherwise would 
and what those differences might mean for regulatory 
approaches.  Yet, this is perhaps the most important inquiry 
regulators should undertake as they grapple with crafting law 
that guides future generations of technology developers and 
users. 
Human development2-centered legislative analyses of new 
technologies may be rare because a flawed assumption is 
widely held in the law regarding the nature of human 
development.  Human development has traditionally been 
conceptualized as a linear proposition—a steady upward 
trajectory with expected outcomes based on age.  We use bright 
line age restrictions in many contexts, for example, presuming 
adults are more developed than children.3 
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 1. When I speak of technology-mediated space, I mean the totality of all 
human exchanges that rely on technology to facilitate them in material part. 
For example, all exchanges through the Internet are “technology mediated”, as 
are automated teller withdrawals, airport check-in procedures, and credit card 
transactions in real space. 
 2. See, e.g., Biology Online, available at http://www.biology-
online.org/dictionary/Human_development (last visited Apr. 11, 2007) (human 
development is “continuous sequential changes which occur in the 
physiological and psychological functions during the individuals [sic] life”). 
 3. For example, only people aged eighteen or over are typically allowed 
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The premise for this approach is founded in the traditional 
developmental psychology theory of Jean Piaget4 and his 
progeny.  However, more recent theories of developmental 
psychology point out the flaws in reliance on linear paradigms.5  
The major shortcoming of the linear approach is its failure to 
acknowledge the role that the environment and cultural tools,6 
such as technology, play in development.  Variations in 
developmental context result in fundamentally different 
developmental outcomes.7  This variation presents a critical 
question for the future of technology regulation.  By changing 
the technology tools of an environment, users’ development is 
fundamentally altered, and regulation focused on a particular 
technology tool becomes obsolete.8  These dynamics are better 
to vote in political elections in the United States. 
 4. Key works of Jean Piaget include B. INHELDER & J. PIAGET, THE 
EARLY GROWTH OF LOGIC IN THE CHILD: CLASSIFICATION AND SERIATION (E. 
A. Lunzer & D. Papert, trans., W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1964); BÄRBEL 
INHELDER & J. PIAGET, THE GROWTH OF LOGICAL THINKING FROM CHILDHOOD 
TO ADOLESCENCE: AN ESSAY ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF FORMAL OPERATIONAL 
STRUCTURES (Anne Parsons & Stanley Milgram, trans., Basic Books, Inc. 
1958); J. PIAGET, BIOLOGY AND KNOWLEDGE (Beatrix Walsh, trans., Univ. of 
Chicago Press 1971) (1967); J. PIAGET, THE CHILD’S CONCEPTION OF NUMBER 
(C. Gattegno & F. M. Hodgson, trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1952) 
(1941); JEAN  PIAGET, THE CHILD’S CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD (1928); J. 
PIAGET, THE CHILD’S CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (1955); JEAN PIAGET, 
INTRODUCTION A L’ÉPISTÉMOLOGIE GÉNÉTIQUE: TOMES 1-3 (Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1950); J. PIAGET, LOGIQUE ET CONNAISSANCE 
SCIENTIFIQUE  (1967); J. PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 
(Marjorie Gabain, trans., Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1932); J. 
PIAGET, THE ORIGINS OF INTELLIGENCE IN CHILDREN (Margaret Cook, trans., 
Int’l Univ. Press, Inc. 1953) (1936); J. PIAGET, SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES (Leslie 
Smith, ed., Terrance Brown et al., trans., Routledge 1995) (1965); J. PIAGET, 
STUDIES IN REFLECTING ABSTRACTION (Robert L. Campbell, ed. & trans., 
Psychology Press 2001) (1977) [hereinafter PIAGET, REFLECTING 
ABSTRACTION]. 
 5. See, e.g., LEV VYGOTSKY, THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE (1962). 
 6. The term “cultural tool” is loosely defined as a tool which permits an 
individual to accomplish more than she/he otherwise could and arose out of 
the work of developmental psychologist Lev Vygotsky.  For a discussion of 
cultural tools, see James V. Wertsch & Peeter Tulviste, L. S. Vygotsky and 
Contemporary Developmental Psychology, in AN INTRODUCTION TO VYGOTSKY 
SECOND EDITION 59, 67 (Harry Daniels ed. 2d ed., 2005) 
 7. For example, a teenager with a laptop and an email account living in 
Minneapolis can befriend a person living in Ghana and learn information 
about life in Ghana otherwise unavailable to this teen.  The cumulative 
learning arising out of these technology facilitated experiences alter the 
developmental process of this Minneapolis teenager. 
 8. For example, the Controlling the Assault of Nonsolicited Pornography 
and Marketing Act (CAN-SPAM Act) fell prey to this flawed assumption.  
MATWYSHYN A. Technology, Commerce, Development, Identity. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
2007;8(2):515-549. 
2007]  TECH., COMMERCE, DEVELOPMENT, IDENTITY 517 
                                                          
addressed by nonlinear developmental psychology than by 
traditional linear paradigms. 
This article introduces nonlinear developmental paradigms 
of contextualist and ecological developmental psychology theory 
to the debate over technology regulation.  It argues that 
technology regulation presents a strong example of the dangers 
and inefficiencies of blindly adopting an approach to regulating 
human conduct based solely on linear developmental 
assumptions.  This article specifically explores the legal 
implications of technology-mediated human development using 
the technology policy arena of corporate child data security 
contracting regulation. 
Section I introduces the major debates in current legal 
literature regarding technology regulation and describes the 
role of linear developmental assumptions in certain existing 
regulatory paradigms.  Section II presents an introduction to 
nonlinear developmental psychology theory, contrasts it to 
linear theory, and describes the pivotal role that technology 
tools play in developmental outcomes.  Section III uses the 
example of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(COPPA)9 and the corporate child data protection contracting 
obligations thereunder to illustrate the practical shortcomings 
of always presuming developmental linearity in regulatory 
paradigms.  Section IV argues that technology regulation 
should first and foremost be understood as the regulation of 
human development; it usually requires a nonlinear 
developmental paradigm as its starting point.  Only regulation 
which adopts a focus on user behaviors in social context can 
succeed; regulation focusing on technology creation, on the 
Controlling the Assault of Nonsoliticed pronography and Marketing Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (2003) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
7701-7713 and 18 U.S.C. § 1037).  The definition of the types of technology 
communications regulated by the CAN SPAM Act are limited to email 
communications and do not consider the same regulatory concerns posed by, 
for example, unsolicited instant messaging communications. As such, the 
legislation has limited efficacy because the technology used for the 
communications adapts to accommodate the existence of a technology specific 
regulatory paradigm.  Developers of code simply generated work around 
solutions for the content and users continue to receive unwanted technology 
mediated communications.  For a discussion of definitional shortcomings of 
“spam” under the CAN SPAM Act and technology adaptation see, e.g., Andrea 
M. Matwyshyn, Penetrating the Zombie Collective: Spam as an International 
Security Issue, 3 SCRIPT-ED 4 (2006); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Spam and 
Security: Recognizing the Connection and Assessing Legal Strategy After the 
CAN-SPAM Act, 5 ILB 307 (March 2004). 
 9. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1651-6506 
(2000). 
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other hand, will not.  Our regulatory paradigms must be 
sensitive to these emergent10 human development dynamics. 
I. TRADITIONAL REGULATION PARADIGMS FOR 
TECHNOLOGY-MEDIATED COMMERCE: IS TECHNOLOGY 
SPECIAL? 
Society has undergone an economic and cultural shift 
driven by technology.11  Both industry pundits12 and the U.S 
Department of Commerce assert that the “new economy” is not 
a myth and that a fundamental, information technology-driven 
change has occurred.13  In a 2002 report, the Department of 
Commerce14 indicated that despite the recession within the 
 10. Emergence is order that arises from the interactions of individual 
actors within a complex system, demonstrating a global pattern that could not 
have been forecast simply from understanding the behavior of one particular 
actor.  See STEVEN JOHNSON, EMERGENCE: THE CONNECTED LIVES OF ANTS, 
BRAINS, CITIES AND SOFTWARE 18 (Scribner 2001). 
 11. Lee Price & George McKittrick, Setting the Stage: The “New Economy” 
Endures Despite Reduced IT Investment, in DIGITAL ECONOMY 2002 1, 5 (U.S. 
Dep’t of Commerce 2002), available at 
https://www.esa.doc.gov/reports/DE2002r1.pdf. 
 12. See, e.g., ASPEN INSTITUTE, WHEN PUSH COMES TO PULL: THE NEW 
ECONOMY AND CULTURE OF NETWORKING TECHNOLOGY (2006), available at 
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/atf/cf/%7BDEB6F227-659B-4EC8-8F84-
8DF23CA704F5%7D/2005InfoTechText.pdf 
 13. See Price & McKittrick, supra note 11, at 5 (“The central feature of the 
[technology-driven] ‘new economy’ has been a higher growth rate of 
productivity, which in turn has brought faster gains in our standards of 
living.”). 
 14. David Henry & Donald Dalton, Information Technology Industries in 
the New Economy, in DIGITAL ECON. 2002 23, 23-24 (U.S. Dep’t of Commerce 
2002), available at https://www.esa.doc.gov/reports/DE2002r1.pdf.  The 
information technology industry is credited with 29% of the United States’ 
economy’s real growth, and 26% of such growth in 2000.  Id. at 25-26.  During 
2001, “as employment dropped by 1.4 percent in the total private sector, 
employment gained 0.5 % in telecom services and 1.4 % in computer software 
and services.”  Price & McKittrick, supra note 11, at 4-5.  As of 2003, the most 
recent year in which a report was published, “IT producing industries became 
once again an important ingredient in an overall U.S. economic expansion.”  
David Henry & Donald Dalton, Information Technology Producing 
Industries—Hopeful Signs in 2003, in DIGITAL ECON. 2003 9, 9 (U.S. Dep’t of 
Commerce 2003), available at https://www.esa.doc.gov/2003.cfm (follow Digital 
Economy 2003 Chapter 1 hyperlink).  Similarly, as of 2002, seven of the ten 
fastest growing occupations were projected to be in the information technology 
industry.  Sandra D. Cooke, Jobs in the New Economy, in DIGITAL ECON. 2002 
41, 48 (U.S. Dep’t of Commerce 2002), available at 
https://www.esa.doc.gov/reports/DE2002r1.pdf .  Meanwhile, in late 2002, 
Silicon Valley began to recover from the technology bust of 2000-2001. Jim 
Hopkins, Hints of recovery in Silicon Valley, USA TODAY, Dec. 11, 2002, at 3B.  
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industry, information technology producers still contributed 
disproportionately to the United States’ economic growth and 
continued to grow at double digit rates.15 Most people consider 
familiarity with computers an essential element of the ability 
to achieve future economic success.16  This section briefly 
reviews the historical legal debate surrounding three key sets 
of technology policy issues from the last ten years.  In each set 
of issues, judges and regulators have been asking themselves 
whether technology regulation is “special.”  In other words, 
judges have been forced to confront the question of whether 
current regulatory paradigms can expand to successfully 
address technological innovation.  This question remains 
unresolved for each set of issues, questioning the success of 
current regulatory paradigms.  A new set of regulatory 
paradigms may be needed, one that is able to evolve alongside 
and simultaneously with the technology interactions it governs. 
A. DO TECHNOLOGY TRANSACTIONS REQUIRE SPECIAL RULES? 
Perhaps the earliest case law and legal theory discussions 
of appropriate paradigms for technology regulation occurred in 
the context of technology contracting.17  Technology, both as 
Studies indicate, however, that increasing numbers of workers are not able to 
acquire access to the technological resources needed to ensure productivity in 
a progressively digitized world economy.  See Luc Soete, ICT’s and 
Employment: The Problem of Job Quality, 140 INT’L LABOUR REV. 143, 156 
(2001).  The impact of information and communications technologies on jobs is 
not yet known and no outcome is inevitable.  See id. at 160.  Technology-driven 
changes in organizational structures, employment relations, worker 
autonomy, and work organization will not automatically result in higher job 
quality.  See id. at 154-57.  In 2000, 800,000 technology jobs were estimated to 
have gone unfilled because of a dearth of qualified workers.  Microsoft Corp., 
Valuing Diversity, http://www.microsoft.com/issues/essays/2000/11-
15diversity.mspx (Published Nov. 15, 2000).  This resulted in an estimated 
opportunity cost of $4 billion per year.  Id.  Although numbers from 2000 may 
reflect inflated employment resulting from the technology “bubble,” the 
“[g]rowth in demand for high quality digital products and electronically 
delivered services is expected to fuel the demand for skilled IT workers in the 
future.”  Cooke, supra, at 59. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See, e.g., EDUCATIONAL SERVICES & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
DIVISION INSTRUCTIONAL RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY UNIT, CHANCELLOR’S 
OFFICE, CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY COLLEGES, TECHNOLOGY II STRATEGIC PLAN 
2000-2005 1 (2000), available at 
http://eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2/content_storage_01/0000000b/80/26
/03/80.pdf. 
 17. See, e.g., Step-Saver Data Sys. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 
1991) (deciding the issue of what constituted the agreed use of the technology). 
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the subject matter of agreements18 as well as the technological 
means of contract formation,19 presented challenges to 
traditional contracting paradigms.20  Similarly, technology 
exacerbated preexisting doctrinal tensions in contract law with 
regard to, for example, the tension between the efficiency of 
form contracting and the desire for personalized assent in 
contracts.21 
As the subject matter of transactions, new technology 
raised questions regarding whether separate default rules 
under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) should be required 
for software transactions.22  Proponents of revisions to the UCC 
argue that software presents a different context from a 
standard goods transaction and calls for new rules.23  Those 
opposed argued that previous rules could grow to encompass 
changes in types of goods and that attempting to craft 
technology-specific rules would result in a limited approach 
that would be outgrown.24  Ultimately, the UCC Article 2 
 18. I am  referring to debates over agreements such as software and 
digital content licensing agreements, software and website development 
agreements,  and online services agreements such as hosting agreements.  For 
a discussion of issues in software licenses, see, e.g., Robert Gomulkiewicz, 
Getting Serious About User-Friendly Mass Marketing Licensing for Software, 
12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 687 (2004). 
 19. I am referring to debates over enforceability of, for example, 
clickwrapped  agreements versus browsewrapped agreements such as terms of 
use.  For a discussion of terms of use, see, e.g., Mark Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 
MINN. L. REV. 459 (2006). 
 20. Specht v. Netscape, 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 
306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Assent may be registered by a signature, a 
handshake, or a click of a computer mouse transmitted across the invisible 
ether of the Internet.”); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451-53 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (in which the use of software was at issue).  For a discussion and 
analysis of the above and other cases dealing with contracts and software use, 
see Ryan J. Casamiquela, Contractual Assent and Enforceability in 
Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 475 (2002). 
 21. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1451-53 (pointing out the regularity 
of purchasing software before agreeing to the terms of use and discussing 
when a contract is formed). 
 22. See, e.g., Warren E. Agin & Scott N. Kumis, A Framework for 
Understanding Electronic Information Transactions, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 
277, 298 (2005).  Today the digital contracting landscape has been further 
complicated by the software industry’s shift from an off-the-shelf software 
model to a services-focused model which includes both code and support.  Id. 
at 299. 
 23. Lorin Brennan, Understanding the Uniform Computer Information 
Transactions Act and the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act: Why Article 2 
Cannot Apply to Software Transactions, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 459, 534-45 (2000). 
 24. Peter A. Alces, W(h)ither Warranty: The B(l)oom of Products Liability 
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revision was considered impractical by many and it did not 
gain widespread acceptance.25  Whether there should be 
default rules in technology transactions remains unresolved, 
particularly with regard to default contracting rules for using, 
sharing and creating open source code.26 
In the context of legislating rules for technology mediated 
contract formation, federal27 and state28 digital signature 
in Cases of Sufficient Software Design, 87 CAL. L. REV. 269, 277 (1999). 
 25. The revisions were not approved by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.  Compare NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, AMENDMENTS TO UNIFORM COMPUTER 
INFORMATION TRANSACTION ACT (2002), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/UCITA_amds_AM02.pdf , with NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM COMPUTER 
INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT (2002), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/2002final.pdf.  For a discussion of the 
proposed revisions to UCC Article 2 addressing software transactions, see 
Linda J. Rusch, A History and Perspective of Revised Article 2: The 
Neverending Saga of a Search for Balance, 52 SMU L. REV. 1683 (1999); 
Richard E. Speidel, Contract Formation and Modification Under Revised 
Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1305 (1994); and Richard E. Speidel, 
Revising UCC Article 2: A View from the Trenches, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 607 
(2001). 
 26. Because of the unique, nonhierarchical method of development 
presented by open source code, the agreements frequently present a different 
set of restrictions on code use See Agin & Kumis, supra note 22, at 329-30.  
For a discussion of the challenges facing open source contracts, see, for 
example, Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Entrepreneurial Open Source Software 
Hackers: MySQL and its Dual Licensing, 9 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 203 
(2004); Andrés Guadamuz González, Open Science: Open Source Licenses in 
Scientific Research, 7 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 321 (2006); Stephen M. Maurer et al., 
Finding Cures for Tropical Diseases: Is Open Source an Answer?, 6 MINN. J. L. 
SCI. & TECH. 169 (2004); David McGowan, Legal Implications of Open-Source 
Software, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 241 (2001); Peter P. Swire, A Theory of 
Disclosure for Security and Competitive Reasons: Open Source, Proprietary 
Software, and Government Systems, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1333 (2006); Greg R. 
Vetter, The Collaborative Integrity of Open-Source Software, 2004 UTAH L. 
REV. 563 (2004); and Greg R. Vetter, “Infectious” Open Source Software: 
Spreading Incentives or Promoting Resistance?, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 53 (2004). 
 27. For a discussion of electronic signature legislation, see, for example, 
Juan Andres Avellan V., John Hancock in Borderless Cyberspace: The Cross-
Jurisdictional Validity of Electronic Signatures and Certificates in Recent 
Legislation Texts, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 301 (1998); Anthony M. Balloon, From 
Wax Seals to Hypertext: Electronic Signatures, Contract Formation, and a New 
Model for Consumer Protection in Internet Transactions, 50 EMORY L.J. 905 
(2001); Carl Carl, et al., Are Online Business Transactions Executed by 
Electronic Signatures Legally Binding?, 2001 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 5 (2001); 
Lance C. Ching, Electronic Signatures: A Comparison of American and 
European Legislation, 25 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 199 (2001-2002); 
David E. Ewan, et al. It’s the Message, Not the Medium!, Electronic Record and 
Electronic Signature Rules Preserve Existing Focus of the Law on Content, Not 
Medium of Recorded Land Title Instruments, 60 BUS. LAW. 1487  (2005); 
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legislation established parity for real space and virtual space 
technology mediated signatures.  This legislative statement 
came relatively early in the mainstreaming and 
commercialization of the Internet, arriving before users and 
businesses understood how to fully leverage it.  Although 
financial services companies, particularly brokerage houses, 
were early adopters of digital signatures, many other 
companies were sometimes slow to incorporate digital 
contracting into their procedures.29 Consequently, digital 
Susanna Frederick Fischer, Saving Rosencrantz and Guildenstern in a Virtual 
World? A Comparative Look at Recent Global Electronic Signature Legislation, 
7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 229 (2001); Gregory Todd Jones, Electronic 
Signatures and Records: Permit the Use of Electronic Signatures and Records 
Even When a Statute, Regulation or Other Rule of Law Specifies a Non-
Electronic Type of Signature or Record, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 6 (2001); Robert 
Gilbert Johnston, Digital Signature and Electronic Document Verification, 17 
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 721 (1999); R.R. Jueneman & R.J. 
Robertson, Jr., Biometrics and Digital Signatures in Electronic Commerce, 38 
JURIMETRICS J. 427 (1998); Stephen Mason, Electronic Signatures in Practice, 
6 J. HIGH TECH. L. 148 (2006); Marianne Menna, From Jamestown to the 
Silicon Valley, Pioneering a Lawless Frontier: The Electronic Signatures in 
Global and National Commerce Act, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH 12 (2001); Sarah E. 
Roland, Note, The Uniform Electronic Signatures in Global and National 
Commerce Act: Removing Barriers to E-Commerce or Just Replacing Them 
with Privacy and Security Issues?, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 625 (2001); Thomas 
J. Smedinghoff & Ruth Hill Bro, Moving with Change: Electronic Signature 
Legislation as a Vehicle for Advancing E-Commerce, 17 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 723 (1999); Jared Sommer, Electronic Signatures and 
the UETA: E-Commerce in an Insecure E-World, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 507 (2001); 
Jonathan E. Stern, The Electronic Signatures in Global and National 
Commerce Act, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 391 (2001); Ashoke S. Talukdar, 
Electronic Signatures in E-Heathcare: The Need for a Federal Standard, 18 
J.L. & HEALTH 95 (2003-04); Mike Watson, Comment, E-Commerce and E-
Law; Is Everything E-Okay? Analysis of the Electronic Signatures in Global 
and National Commerce Act, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 803 (2001); Jane K. Winn, 
The Emperor’s New Clothes: The Shocking Truth about Digital Signatures and 
Internet Commerce, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 353 (2001). 
 28. For a discussion of state level digital signature statutes, see, for 
example, Robin C. Capehart & Mark A. Starcher, “Wired Wonderful West 
Virginia” – Electronic Signatures in the Mountain State, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 
303 (2002); Allison W. Freedman, The Electronic Signatures Act: Preempting 
State Law by Legislating Contradictory Technology Standards, 2001 UTAH L. 
REV. 807 (2001); Andrew D. Stewart, Navigating the E-Sign Nebula: Federal 
Recognition of Electronic Signatures and Impact on State Law, 24 U. HAW. L. 
REV. 309 (2001); William E. Wyrough, Jr. & Ron Klein, The Electronic 
Signature Act of 1996: Breaking Down Barriers to Widespread Electronic 
Commerce in Florida, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 407 (1997). 
 29. See e.g., FTC and DOC on Digital Signatures Legislation, 
http://lists.essential.org/random-bits/msg00194.html (last visited Apr. 11, 
2007). 
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signature legislation’s full potential perhaps remains 
unrealized. 
Corollary questions also pertain to the logistics of online 
payment mechanisms in digitally executed contracts.  
Regulators have not adopted a clear position regarding whether 
Internet mediated payment methods require the extension of 
real space default rules for financial transactions and consumer 
protections.  For example, the FDIC stated in an advisory letter 
that it does not consider PayPal to be a bank. However, various 
state regulators have begun to question whether PayPal is 
operating an unauthorized money transmitting service, or 
illegal banking service.30  Scholars are at odds on this point as 
well, debating whether consumer protection necessitates 
extending the penumbra of real space banking law to 
cyberspace.31 
Finally, tensions persist in the age-old form contracting 
debates over efficiency through adhesion contracts versus 
fairness through customization and negotiability.32  The 
technology context is beginning to disrupt the existing 
imperfect peace.  In particular, end user license agreements 
(which authorize conduct many technologists consider 
unethical)33 now challenge legal lines.  For example, digital 
rights management software which comes bundled with other 
products engages in conduct that would constitute computer 
intrusion were it not for consent granted during installation 
through ostensible acceptance of a form contract.34  The clash 
of traditional intellectual property law paradigms with 
technology contracts presents unresolved questions about 
whether technology is special, as demonstrated in the dramatic 
differences in contracting norms between open source and 
proprietary software licenses.35 
 30. See Troy Wolverton, Feds: PayPal not a bank, CNET NEWS.COM, Mar. 
12, 2002, http://news.com.com/2100-1017-858264.html. 
 31. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Regulating Internet Payment 
Intermediaries, 82 TEX. L. REV. 681, 702-15 (2004). 
 32. For a discussion of the tradeoffs between standardization and 
customization, see, for example, Margaret Jane Radin, Online 
Standardization and the Integration of Text and Machine, 70 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1125 (2002). 
 33. For a discussion of overreaching in digital rights management 
software and license agreements, see Andrea M. Matwyshyn, 
Technoconsen(t)sus, __WASH.UL.REV.__ ( 2007) 
 34. Id. 
 35. For examples of open source license agreements see, e.g., Nelson, 
Open Source, Open Source Licenses, http://www.opensource.org/licenses 
(submitted Sept. 2006). For a discussion of Internet contracting, see, for 
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B. ARE TECHNOLOGY HARMS NOVEL AND DO THEY NEED 
SPECIAL REDRESS? 
Court and scholars have also struggled with the question of 
whether technology mediated harms are qualitatively and 
quantitatively different from real-space harms.  In other words, 
the question was whether these harms warranted special 
redress, and, if yes, how should any such damages be 
calculated.  Specifically, harms relating to speech, dignitary 
harms, child protection, and intangible property damage vexed 
judges and scholars. 
Because of the novelty and increased anonymity of the 
Internet, free speech became emboldened in virtual space. 
Predictably, claims arose out of this emboldened speech.36  
Corporate claims arose relating to alleged harms from various 
forms of Internet speech—postings or emails of disgruntled or 
overzealous corporate insiders37 or outside pump-and-dump 
fraudsters posting information to financial bulletin boards38 or 
other Internet forums.39 
For consumers, Internet communications raised questions 
of dignitary harms, unwanted access to personal property, such 
as intrusion into their hard drives, and unwanted use of 
personally identifiable information.  Internet defamation 
claims arose.  Spam began as merely annoying speech usurping 
resources but now may be imposing financial harms onto 
example, Clayton P. Gillette, Pre-Approved Contracts for Internet Commerce, 
42 HOUS. L. REV. 975 (2005); Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, 
Survey of the Law of Cyberspace: Internet Contracting Cases 2004-2005, 61 
BUS. LAW. 433 (2005). 
 36. For a discussion of anonymity on the Internet, see, for example, David 
L. Sobel, The Process that “John Doe” is Due: Addressing the Legal Challenge 
to Internet Anonymity, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3 (2000); Thomas F. Cotter & 
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous Speech 
(Minn. Legal Stud. Research Paper No. 06-37, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=925736. 
 37. For a discussion of corporate insider technology harms, see Elizabeth 
A. Rowe, When Trade Secrets Become Shackles: Fairness and the Inevitable 
Disclosure Doctrine, 7 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 167 (2005). 
 38. See, e.g., Ian Ballon, Jonathan Eisenberg, Poison Pen: Chat Board 
Liars May Be Vulberable to Lawsuits, 754 PLI/PAT 163 (2003). 
 39. For a discussion of Internet pump and dump schemes, see David B. 
Kramer, The Way It Is and the Way It Should Be: Liability Under §10(B) of the 
Exchange Act and Rule 10B-5 Thereunder for Making False and Misleading 
Statements as Part of a Scheme to “Pump and Dump” a Stock, 13 U. MIAMI 
BUS. L. REV. 243 (2005). 
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recipients in new ways.40  Similarly, forms of spyware,41 may 
currently involve conduct closer to computer intrusion42  than 
digital speech.43  Finally, new types of dignitary harms may 
arise from digital divides in our society.44  Courts generally 
 41. For a discussion of the dangers of spam and the shortcomings of 
regulatory efforts, see, for example, Peter B. Maggs, Abusive Advertising on 
the Internet (SPAM) Under United States Law, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 385 (2006); 
Beth Simone Noveck, Public Participation in Electronic Rulemaking: 
Electronic Democracy or Notice-and-Spam?, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Fall 
2004, at 7; and Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Penetrating the Zombie Collective: 
Spam as an International Security Issue, 3 SCRIPT-ED 370 (2006), available 
at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol3-4/matwyshyn.asp. 
41.For a discussion of the dangers of spam and the shortcomings of regulatory 
efforts, see, for example, Peter B. Maggs, Abusive Advertising on the Internet 
(SPAM) Under United States Law, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 385 (2006); Beth 
Simone Noveck, Public Participation in Electronic Rulemaking: Electronic 
Democracy or Notice-and-Spam?, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Fall 2004, at 7; and 
Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Penetrating the Zombie Collective: Spam as an 
International Security Issue, 3 SCRIPT-ED 370 (2006), available at 
http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol3-4/matwyshyn.asp. 
 42. For a discussion of computer intrusion and exceeding authorized 
access, see Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, 
and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208 (2004). 
 43. See generally Ian Ayres & Matthew Funk, Marketing Privacy, 20 YALE 
J. ON REG. 77 (2003); Joshua A. Marcus, Commercial Speech on the Internet: 
Spam and the First Amendment, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 245, 293-97 
(1998). 
 44. Digital divides refer to unequal access to technology that fall along 
socio-economic and demographic lines; they can be divided into two categories 
– access divides and production divides.  For a discussion of access divides see, 
e.g., EDUCATION WEEK, TECHNOLOGY COUNTS 2001: THE NEW DIVIDES (May 
2001), available at http://counts.edweek.org/sreports/tc01/; Andrew G. Celli, 
Jr. & Kenneth M. Dreifach, Postcards from the Edge: Surveying the Digital 
Divide, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 53 (2002) (arguing that three separate 
digital divides exist: technology access, capital access, and treatment 
differences among different consumers in pricing and purchase terms); 
Patricia F. First & Yolanda Y. Hart, Access to Cyberspace: The New Issue in 
Educational Justice, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 385 (2002) (arguing that existing civil 
rights laws are applicable to unequal Internet access for identifiable groups); 
Allen S. Hammond, The Digital Divide in the New Millennium, 20 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 135 (2002); William E. Kennard, Equality in the Information 
Age, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 553 (1999) (arguing that the digital divide is defined 
by both unequal access to technology and by unequal access to ownership 
opportunities of broadcast companies); Donald R. Tetreault, Technology 
Equity: Are We Asking the Right Questions?, 66 SCH. BUS. AFFS., Aug. 2001, at 
28 (arguing that effectively measuring “technology equity” is critical to 
determining if it has been achieved); Int’l Roundtable, The Lifelong Learning, 
New Techs. Gap: Reaching the Disadvantaged, The Lifelong Learning and 
New Technologies Gap (Dec. 10, 1999) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.literacyonline.org/products/ili/pdf/IP0001.pdf. For a discussion of 
production divides, see Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Silicon Ceilings: Information 
Technology Equity, the Digital Divide and the Gender Gap Among Information 
Technology Professionals, 2 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 35 (2003). 
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have not provided recourse for unequal access,45 though the 
Americans with Disabilities Act may be expanded in the near 
future to require website accessibility for the disabled.46  Thus, 
no consensus exists as to whether harms resulting from 
technology are unique and warrant different regulatory 
paradigms. 
Technology easily and obviously also exacerbated real 
space harms in the area of child protection.  Several statutory 
attempts to protect children from online predators, unsuitable 
content and data mining have been made.47  However, the 
approaches have not alleviated the problems faced in this area, 
and courts have not always been willing to enforce the 
statutes.48  Filters and other proactive technological means, 
rather, are commonly advocated as being more effective than 
reactive legal measures.49  Legal scholars diverge as to whether 
technology focused statutes are the optimal means for 
minimizing and redressing these harms.50 
 45. See Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co, 385 F.3d 1324 (2004) 
(holding the ADA does not extend to the Internet because the Internet is not a 
place of public accomodation).  See a discussion of the digital divide in America 
Online Latino v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., No. 02 Civ.4796 LAK, 2002 WL 
31663568 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2002). 
 46. See Declan McCullagh, Judge: Disabilities Act doesn’t cover Web, 
CNET NEWS.COM, Oct. 21, 2002, 
http://news.com.com/Judge+Disabilities+Act+doesnt+cover+Web/2100-1023_3-
962761.html (reporting that a federal judge ruled that Southwest Airlines does 
not have to make its web site more accessible to the blind).  But see, e.g., Nat’l 
Federation of the Blind v. Target Corporation, Case 3:06-cv-01802-MHP 
Document 62 Filed 09/06/2006,  N.D. Cal.(2006); OUT-LAW News, Target 
Lawsuit Tests Limits of US Web Accessibility Law, Dec. 9, 2006, 
http://www.out-law.com/page-7285. 
 47. See, e.g., Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 6501–06 (2000); Child Online Protection Act (COPA), 47 U.S.C. § 231 
(2000); Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA) 114 Stat. 2763A-335 (2000); 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2006). 
 48. See, e.g., United States v. American Library Association., Inc., 539 U.S. 
194, 200-01 (2003), rev’g 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
 49. For a discussion of filters, see United States v. American Library 
Association., Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2003), rev’g 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. 
Pa. 2002). 
 50. For a discussion of technology and child protection, see, for example, 
William D. Araiza, Captive Audiences, Children and the Internet, 41 BRANDEIS 
L.J. 397 (2003); Jared Chrislip, Filtering the Internet Like a Smokestack: How 
the Children’s Internet Protection Act Suggests a New Internet Regulation 
Analogy, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 261 (2005); Dannielle Cisneros, “Virtual Child” 
Pornography on the Internet: A “Virtual” Victim?, 2002 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 
19; Cathleen A. Cleaver, Cyberchaos vs. Ordered Liberty: Protecting Children 
from Pornography on the Internet, 1 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 61 (1997); Mehagen 
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Scholars and judges have considered redress for technology 
harms through speech restrictions, intellectual property 
statutes, computer intrusion statutes and the trespass to 
chattels51  doctrine.  Yet, the unwillingness of courts to 
robustly calculate damages in cases of digital harm52 and the 
Doyle, Bad Apples in Cyberspace: The Sexual Exploitation and Abuse of 
Children over the Internet, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 119 (1999); F. Barrett 
Faulkner, Applying Old Law to New Births: Protecting the Interests of 
Children Born Through New Reproductive Technology, 2 J. HIGH TECH. L. 27 
(2003); Rick Gallagher, Downward Departures: Curing the Lenient Sentencing 
of Internet Child Pornographers and Statutory Rapists, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. 
& POL’Y 111 (2000); Mitchell P. Goldstein, Congress and the Courts Battle Over 
the First Amendment: Can the Law Really Protect Children from Pornography 
on the Internet?, 21 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 141 (2003); Steven 
D. Hinckley, Your Money or Your Speech: The Children’s Internet Protection 
Act and the Congressional Assault on the First Amendment in Public Libraries, 
80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1025 (2002); Adam Horowitz, The Constitutionality of the 
Children’s Internet Protection Act, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 425 (2000); Eric 
Hwang, Child Pornography on the Internet, 2002 UCLA J.L. & TECH. NOTES 7 
(2002); Susan Hanley Kosse, Try, Try Again: Will Congress Ever Get It Right? 
A Summary of Internet Pornography Laws Protecting Children and Possible 
Solutions, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 721 (2004); Susan S. Kreston, Computer Search 
and Seizure Issues in Internet Crimes against Children Cases, 30 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 327 (2004); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., 
Childproofing the Internet, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 447 (2003); Philip G. Peters, Jr., 
Harming Future Persons: Obligations to the Children of Reproductive 
Technology, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375 (1999); Madeleine Mercedes 
Plasencia, Internet Sexual Predators: Protecting Children in the Global 
Community, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 15 (2000); Audrey Rogers, Playing 
Hide and Seek: How to Protect Virtual Pornographers and Actual Children on 
the Internet, 50 VILL. L. REV. 87 (2005); Cortney Scott, The Children’s Internet 
Protection Act: Filtering Freedom or Protecting Young Minds?, 2003 UCLA J.L. 
& TECH. NOTES 28 (2003); Felix Wu, United States v. American Library Ass’n: 
The Children’s Internet Protection Act, Library Filtering, and Institutional 
Roles, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 555 (2004). 
 51. For a discussion of Internet trespass, see Michael R. Siebecker, 
Cookies and the Common Law: Are Internet Advertisers Trespassing on our 
Computers?, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 893 (2003). 
 52. For a discussion of calculating damages in technology intrusion 
contexts, see George Roach & William J. Michiels, Damages Is the Gatekeeper 
Issue for Federal Computer Fraud, 8 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 61 (2006).  
For example, in the context of intentional violations where an individual 
exceeds authorized access to a computer or network, no statutory damages are 
available under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).  18 U.S.C. § 1030 
(2000).  In addition, the approach used to assess damages varies from court to 
court.  Under section 1030(g) of the CFAA, a private right of action is available 
for any victim who suffers “damage or loss” due to a violation of the CFAA.  
Damage, as defined under § 1030(e)(8) of the statute, requires either (A) losses 
aggregating $5,000 during any 1-year period to one or more individuals; (B) 
impairment to medical diagnosis or treatment; (C) physical injury to any 
person; or (D) a threat to public health or safety.  Many plaintiffs have 
encountered problems meeting the $5,000 threshold for damages.  Two schools 
of thought exist regarding the proper interpretation of the CFAA damage 
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hesitation to expand civil doctrines such as trespass to chattels 
into technology contexts calls into question the judiciary’s 
commitment to providing legal redress for harms from digital 
speech.  This judicial reluctance may have in part catalyzed the 
dramatic increases in intangible property harms such as 
identity theft53 and trade secret theft54 of the last ten years. 
C. IS THE INTERNET A SEPARATE LEGAL SPACE NEEDING SPECIAL 
LEGAL RULES? 
The final great theoretical debate in technology legal 
theory revolves around equivalency of virtual and physical 
geography—should the Internet be legally characterized as a 
separate space or merely as an extension of physical space for 
requirements in § 1030(g) for “damage or loss.”  While “damage” is defined and 
requires a plaintiff to meet a threshold of $5,000, the term “loss” is not 
adequately defined in a fashion that allows courts to meaningfully and 
consistently interpret the statute.  Courts have also differed as to whether 
damages to multiple plaintiffs in a class action lawsuit can be aggregated in 
order to meet the $5,000 threshold and the extent to which loss of goodwill can 
be included in calculations.  But under the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act, minimum statutory damages are indicated on the basis of an escalating 
series of violations; minimum damages start at $50, and quickly rise to 
$10,000.  18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2000).  However, a debate exists in the courts 
whether courts have the discretion not to award any damages in some cases.  
See, e.g., Culbertson v. Culbertson, 143 F.3d 825, 827 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding 
that courts have discretion); Reynolds v. Spears, 93 F.3d 428, 434 (8th Cir. 
1996) (same); Nalley v. Nalley, 53 F.3d 649, 652 (4th Cir. 1995) (same).  But 
see Desilets v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 171 F.3d 711, 714-16 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(suggesting in dicta that courts must award damages); Rogers v. Wood, 910 
F.2d 444, 448 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that courts must award a minimum of 
$10,000 in statutory damages per violation), reh’g denied, 914 F.2d 260 (1990); 
Menda Biton v. Menda, 812 F. Supp. 283, 285 (D. Puerto Rico 1993) (holding 
that courts must award damages). 
 53. See, e.g., Declan McCullagh & Anne Broache, Class action suit over ID 
theft tossed out, Oct. 12, 2006, 
http://news.com.com/Class+action+suit+over+ID+theft+tossed+out/2100-
7348_3-6125028.html. 
 54. For a discussion of trade secret theft and technology related damages 
see, e.g., Rowe, supra note 37.  For a discussion of intangible corporate assets 
generated through technology, see Estelle Derclaye, An Economic Analysis of 
the Contractual Protection of Databases, 2005 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 247 
(2005). Scholarly opinions on redress for technology–mediated intellectual 
property harms and privacy harms have been ample on both sides of these 
arguments. See, e.g., Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the 
Limits of Tort Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255 (2005); Lynn M. LoPucki, Did 
Privacy Cause Identity Theft?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1277 (2003); Lynn M. 
LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem, 80 TEX. 
L. REV. 89 (2001); Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the 
Architecture of Vulnerability, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1227 (2003). 
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regulatory purposes?55  In other words, is technology best 
characterized as a limitation on or an extension of social 
control, sovereignty, and autonomy legal frameworks that exist 
in real space. This debate over this legal characterization of 
virtual space began at the time the first browsers came into 
existence.56 A clear divergence of opinion existed in the 
scholarly community over both the legitimacy of the Internet as 
a separate space and the legitimacy of Internet regulation as a 
separate field of legal study.57 
This theoretical debate has its practical incarnation in the 
case law of Internet jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments.  
The lines of geographic sovereignty became ambiguous as far 
away courts sometimes granted litigants general58 or personal 
jurisdiction over residents of other states based  on Internet 
contacts.59  Internationally, foreign courts and regulatory 
 55. For a discussion of the debate, see generally Jack L. Goldsmith, 
Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1199-1200 (1998); David R. 
Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); and Andrew L. Shapiro, The Disappearance of 
Cyberspace and the Rise of Code, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 703, 709 (1998).  
See also Charles Fried, Perfect Freedom or Perfect Control?, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
606, 618 (2000). 
 56. Mosaic was developed in 1993 by two University of Illinois graduate 
students, Marc Andersen and Eric Bina.  JOHN CASSIDY, DOT CON 51 (2002).  
Immediately following the launch of Mosaic, use of the World Wide Web 
increased.  See id. 
 57. Compare, Frank Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207 (1996), with Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the 
Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999). 
 58. General jurisdiction refers to the situation where a court asserts 
jurisdiction over a defendant whose continuous activities in the forum are 
unrelated to the cause of action sued upon but the defendant’s contacts are 
sufficiently substantial and of such a nature as to make the state’s assertion of 
jurisdiction reasonable See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with 
General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 137-39 (2001) (arguing that 
the concept of general jurisdiction is fatally flawed, particularly in the context 
of the Internet, but should not be abandoned). 
 59. For a discussion of various possible approaches to Internet 
jurisdiction, see, for example, Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? 
Toward Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1345 (2001); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Of Nodes and Power Laws: A Network 
Theory Approach to Internet Jurisdiction Through Data Privacy, 98 NW. U. L. 
REV. 493 (2004); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Towards a Hybrid Regulatory Scheme 
for the Internet, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215 (2001); Martin H. Redish, Of New 
Wine and Old Bottles: Personal Jurisdiction, the Internet and the Nature of 
Constitutional Evolution, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 575, 609 (1998); Allan R. Stein, 
Frontiers of Jurisdiction: From Isolation to Connectedness, 2001 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 373; Allan R. Stein, The Unexceptional Problem of Jurisdiction in 
Cyberspace, 32 INT’L LAW, 1167 (1998); Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing 
Business with Doing-Business Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171 (2001). 
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bodies adjudicate matters with foreign defendants engaging in 
technology-mediated international conduct.  Foreign 
defendants refuse to appear or to assert lack of jurisdiction 
even in the face of default judgments,60 exposing the limits of 
international judgment reciprocity. 
Similarly, technology complicated tax nexus 
determinations; questions of tax nexus required determining 
whether the Internet was a separate transactional space or 
whether territorial tax paradigms applied. In particular, 
practical difficulties arose in determining whether adequate 
contacts existed for purposes of nexus between certain Internet 
goods and services and a certain jurisdiction.  For example, one 
vexing tax question pertains to whether and where software, 
especially downloaded software, should be taxed.  Should it be 
taxed at the point of residence on a server or at the place of 
ultimate download by a user?  Similarly, taxation of webbased 
software services present unresolved legal questions that turn 
on where in physical space the Internet services are 
“performed”. 61 
D. LACK OF RESOLUTION IN LEGAL PARADIGMS MAY LEAD TO 
BREAKDOWNS OF USER TRUST 
To date, none of these sets of legal questions have been 
conclusively resolved by either courts or legislatures.  
Technology businesses and users continue to exist in a state of 
regulatory uncertainty.  As a result, one of the most serious 
threats to the future of technology-mediated commerce is a 
breakdown of user trust in technology.62 
 60. See, e.g., Joris Evers, Spam fighter hit with $11.7 million judgment, 
CNET NEWS.COM, Sept. 14, 2006, 
http://news.com.com/Spam+fighter+hit+with+11.7+million+judgment/2100-
7350_3-6116009.html (noting that defendant UK-based Spamhaus “didn’t 
mount a defense in the case; the ruling was a default judgment in absence of 
counterarguments”). 
 61. For a discussion of the technology and tax nexus, see, for example, 
Walter J. Baudier, Internet Sales Taxes From Borders to Amazon: How Long 
Before All Your Purchases Are Taxed?, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 5 (2006); 
Eric A. Ess, Internet Taxation Without Physical Representation? States Seek 
Solution to Stop e-Commerce Sales Tax Shortfalls, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 893 
(2006); Pamela Swidler, The Beginning of the End to a Tax-Free Internet: 
Developing an E-Commerce Clause, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 541 (2006). For a 
discussion of the difficulties in crafting a functional international regime for 
coordinated taxation of Internet purchases, see, e.g., Yariv Brauner, An 
International Tex Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX L.REV. (2003). 
 62. For a discussion of trust and the Internet, see Tamar Frankel, 
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Trust arises through predictability and certainty in 
transactions and recourse.63  However, as demonstrated by the 
preceding discussion, courts, legislators, and scholars have not 
reached consensus on any of the three major sets of technology 
regulation questions debated in the last decade.  This lack of 
consensus suggests that it is necessary to re-examine the 
underlying regulatory assumptions regarding humans’ 
relationship with technology. Perhaps the regulatory focus 
should move away from regulating the technology itself and 
move toward regulating the ways humans interact with 
technology tools. A focus on proactively guiding human 
development of users rather than a focus on reactively 
restricting particular technologies may hold more promise.  
Legislative approaches are usually compartmentalized around 
either restricting a particular technology or resolving a 
particular legal issue.  Rarely is a technology user’s perception 
or development presented as a focus of the overall regulatory 
picture. 
Technology regulation frequently presumes that users are 
a one-dimensional, linear, and stagnant piece of the regulatory 
picture.  This assumption is based in early developmental 
psychology theory.  However, this approach is not informed by 
later bodies of human development theory which view humans 
and their development as inherently dynamic and 
multidimensional. 
This flawed assumption about the linear nature of human 
development may be part of the reason for the inability to craft 
successful regulatory and judicial approaches to technology-
mediated exchanges.  Legislators and judges should seek to 
create a new regulatory picture that supports the dynamic 
levels of complexity that users experience in technology 
mediated exchange.  The new regulatory focus becomes users’ 
development.64  Nonlinear developmental theory contemplates 
Trusting and Non-trusting on the Internet, 81 B.U. L. REV. 457 (2001). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Complexity here refers to complexity theory, the idea that systems 
exist where a large number of similar but independent actors who persistently 
move, respond, and evolve in relation to each other in an increasingly 
sophisticated manner.  For a discussion of complexity theory, see, for example, 
David G. Post & David R. Johnson, “Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent”: 
Toward a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-making in Complex Systems, 
73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055 (1998).  See also, e.g., Erica Beecher-Monas & 
Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Chaos: Predicting Violent Behavior in 
a Post-Daubert World, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845 (2003); Susan W. Brenner, 
Toward a Criminal Law for Cyberspace: Distributed Security, 10 B.U. J. SCI. & 
TECH. L. 1 (2004); Jim Chen, Webs of Life: Biodiversity Conservation as a 
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this set of emergent interactions and may prove instructive for 
beginning to craft new dynamic regulatory paradigms. 
II. NONLINEAR DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 
TECHNOLOGY, AND CONSTRUCTING COMMERCIAL 
IDENTITY 
Human development theory or developmental psychology 
theory can be divided into linear and nonlinear developmental 
theory.65  Linear developmental theory presumes that all 
humans develop in a similar fashion, demonstrating an upward 
developmental trajectory that is tied to chronological age.  
Nonlinear developmental theory adopts the opposite approach.  
It asserts that chronological age cannot necessarily be tied to 
assumptions about development because development is an 
inherently social process that occurs in a particular real-world 
context.66  Consequently, a linear approach to technology 
regulation presumes a homogeneity in the consumer population 
regarding individuals’ sophistication and comfort level with 
technology based on their chronological age.  Chronologically 
older individuals should demonstrate more proficiency than 
those of chronologically younger age.67  A nonlinear approach 
would not make these assumptions.  Linear developmental 
psychology is reflected in the work of theorist Jean Piaget,68 
while nonlinear developmental psychology theory is perhaps 
best reflected in the work of Lev Vygotsky,69 Urie 
Species of Information Policy, 89 IOWA L. REV. 495 (2004); Susan P. Crawford, 
The Biology of the Broadcast Flag, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 603 
(2003); Robert A. Creo, Mediation 2004: The Art and the Artist, 108 PENN. ST. 
L. REV. 1017 (2004); Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly: 
Complexity Theory and Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145 
(2003); Scott H. Hughes, Understanding Conflict in a Postmodern World, 87 
MARQ. L. REV. 681 (2004); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red 
Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 
GEO. L.J. 757 (2003); Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified 
Theory of Wireless Communication, 82 TEX. L. REV. 863 (2004). 
 65. For an overview of developmental psychology theory, see PATRICIA H. 
MILLER, THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY (W.H. Freeman and 
Company 1993) (1983). 
 66. JAMES V. WERTSCH, VYGOTSKY AND THE SOCIAL FORMATION OF MIND 
(1985). 
 67. Id. 
 68. For a discussion of Piaget’s work, see, for example J. FLAVELL, THE 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY OF JEAN PIAGET (1967). 
 69. For a discussion of Vygotsky’s work, see, for example, ALEX KOZULIN, 
VYGOTSKY’S PSYCHOLOGY: A BIOGRAPHY OF IDEAS (1990); FRED NEWMAN & 
LOUIS HOLZMAN, LEV VYGOTSKY: REVOLUTIONARY SCIENTIST (1993); THE 
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Bronfenbrenner, 70 Albert Bandura,71 and Erik Erikson.72 
A.   LINEAR DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY 
Linear developmental psychology theory, as demonstrated 
by the work of Jean Piaget, creates an age-contingent, lock-step 
trajectory for human development.73  Piaget divided 
development into four periods with distinct stages therein, and 
named these periods of development the sensorimotor period, 
the preoperational period, the concrete operational period, and 
the formal operational period.74  The sensorimotor stage lasts 
from birth to age two and is characterized by a child moving 
from simple reflexes to organized behaviors that are oriented 
toward interacting with the external world through goal 
oriented exploration behaviors and object permanence75  
skills.76  The preoperational period, which spans age two until 
age seven, follows, and during this period one develops semiotic 
function—the ability to use symbols.77  Differentiation of other 
people from the self is incomplete, however, even though one is 
VYGOTSKY READER (Rene Van der Veer & Jaan Valsiner, eds., 1994); RENE 
VAN DER VEER & JAAN VALSINER, UNDERSTANDING VYGOTSKY. A QUEST FOR 
SYNTHESIS (1991); NIKOLAI VERESOV, UNDISCOVERED VYGOTSKY: ETUDES ON 
THE PRE-HISTORY OF CULTURAL-HISTORICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1999); JAMES V. 
WERTSCH, VYGOTSKY AND THE SOCIAL FORMATION OF MIND (1985). 
 70. For a discussion of Urie Bronfenbrenner’s work, see Susan S. Lang, 
Urie Bronfenbrenner, Father of Head Start Program and Pre-eminent ‘Human 
Ecologist,’ Dies at age 88, Sept. 26, 2005, 
http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/Sept05/Bronfenbrenner.ssl.html. 
 71. For a discussion of Albert Bandura’s work, see Barry J. Zimmerman & 
Dale H. Schunk, Albert Bandura: The Scholar and His Contributions to 
Educational Psychology, in EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY: A CENTURY OF 
CONTRIBUTIONS  431-54 (Barry J. Zimmerman & Dale H. Schunk eds., 2003). 
 72. For a discussion of Erik Erikson’s work, see ERIK ERIKSON, THE ERIK 
ERIKSON READER (Robert Coles, ed., 2001). 
 73. Linear developmental theories presume a lock-step approach to 
development that has only recently started to fall out of favor.  See, e.g., 
CONSTRUCTING AND RECONSTRUCTING CHILDHOOD: CONTEMPORARY  ISSUES 
IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF CHILDHOOD, 4 (A. James & A. Prout eds., 
1997). 
 74. MILLER, supra note 65, at 42. 
 75. Object permanence refers to the knowledge that an object exists even 
if not in line of sight.  See, e.g., Economic and Social Research Council, 
R000238995 - Object Permanence and A not B Errors: What They Tell Us 
About Infant Development, 
http://www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/Plain_English_Summaries
/social_stability_exclusion/social_exclusion/index321.aspx?ComponentId=9839
&SourcePageId=11719 (last visited Apr. 11, 2007). 
 76. See MILLER, supra note 65, at 43-51. 
 77. See id. at 51-56. 
MATWYSHYN A. Technology, Commerce, Development, Identity. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
2007;8(2):515-549. 
534 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 8:2 
 
                                                          
 
able to interpret the world in terms of the self in a loosely 
logical manner.78  The concrete period comes next, and lasts 
between ages seven and eleven.79  The concrete period is 
marked by the ability to perform logical mental operations, 
which are internalized and can be reversed.80  Finally, the 
formal operational period from age eleven to age fifteen is a 
time characterized by abstract thinking where mental 
operations are not necessarily tied to concrete objects.81  At this 
point in a linear developmental paradigm adulthood arrives 
and development stops.82  Therefore, adulthood signals the 
highest level of development in a linear paradigm, when full 
development is “achieved.”83 
B.  NONLINEAR DEVELOPMENTAL AND IDENTITY THEORY 
Other developmental theorists have developed nonlinear 
approaches that hold important contrary insights to the views 
of Piaget and other linear developmental theorists.84  Unlike 
the lockstep approach of linear theorists, nonlinear theorists 
take a dynamic approach.  An individual interacts with and 
within a particular social context to generate development in 
an emergent manner. 
Lev Vygotsky, the founder of contextualist developmental 
theory and a contemporary of Piaget, introduced the 
importance of analyzing development in a cultural context.85  
The smallest unit of analysis for Vygotsky is the child in a 
particular social context, an inherently variable construction 
across environments and individuals.86  Learning and 
 78. Id. at 53-54. 
 79. See id. at 56. 
 80. See id. at 56-59. 
 81. See id. at 60-62. 
 82. Piaget’s model of cognitive development ends with the acquisition of 
formal operational intelligence during teen years.  For a discussion of various 
linear developmental paradigms see, e.g., ADULT DEVELOPMENT: VOLUME I: 
COMPARISONS AND APPLICATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTAL MODELS (Michael L. 
Commons et. al, eds., 1987). 
 83. See PIAGET, REFLECTING ABSTRACTION, supra note 3; see generally 
MILLER, supra note 65. 
 84. The works of Lev Vygotsky, Urie Bronfenbrenner, Albert Bandura and 
Erik Erikson provide important insights into the way development and 
identity are inherently dialectical and interactionist joint constructions.  
 85. See LEV VYGOTSKY, THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE (Alex Kozulin, ed. & 
trans., 1986). 
 86. LEV VYGOTSKY, MIND AND SOCIETY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER 
MENTAL PROCESSES,86-90 (1978). 
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development occurs on the person-society border through an 
individual interacting inside the “zone of proximal 
development”.87  The zone of proximal development refers to 
the gap between the actual developmental level of the child at 
the time and the higher level of the child’s potential 
development with help from adults or more advanced peers.88  
Help in development comes not only from humans in the 
environment but also from self-help using cultural tools such as 
computers.89  For Vygotsky, humans master themselves from 
the outside through psychological and technical tools, which 
allow individuals to achieve more in their specific context.90  
These tools, however, also vary depending on culture and social 
contexts.91  In other words, the focus of assessment using a 
Vygotskian developmental paradigm is less on the static notion 
of who the child currently is and, rather, more on the dynamic 
question of who the child can become, depending on context and 
tools. 
An elaboration on the evolving, nonlinear nature of social 
contexts that shape development can be found in the work of 
Urie Bronfenbrenner.92  Bronfenbrenner presents an ecological 
model93 that illustrates the importance of reviewing multiple 
levels of social context.94  Specifically, he identifies four levels 
of analysis: (1) macrosystem; (2) mesosystem; (3) exosystem; 
and (4) microsystem.95  Analysis at the macrosystem level 
requires examination of culture as a whole, along with belief 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See, e.g., URIE BRONFENBRENNER, THE ECOLOGY OF HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT: EXPERIMENTS BY NATURE AND DESIGN (1979) [hereinafter 
BRONFENBRENNER, ECOLOGY]; URIE BRONFENBRENNER, INFLUENCES ON 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (1975); URIE BRONFENBRENNER, INFLUENCING HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT (1973); URIE BRONFENBRENNER, ON MAKING HUMAN BEINGS 
HUMAN (1981); URIE  BRONFENBRENNER, TWO WORLDS OF CHILDHOOD (1973); 
URIE BRONFENBRENNER, TWO WORLDS OF CHILDHOOD - US AND USSR (1975); 
R. MYERS & URIE BRONFENBRENNER, THE TWELVE WHO SURVIVE: 
STRENGTHENING PROGRAMMES OF EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
THIRD WORLD (1992). 
 93. An ecological model is a model which conceptualizes a dynamic set of 
interactions in a living system.  For a discussion of ecological models, see, e.g., 
James Moore, Predators and Prey: A New Ecology of Competition, HARV. BUS. 
REV., May/June 1993, at 75. 
 94. See BRONFENBRENNER, ECOLOGY, supra note 92. 
 95. See id.  at 7-8. 
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systems and ideologies underlying cultural rules and norms.96  
In other words, the analysis focuses on the mechanisms of 
social governance and the worldview prevalent in civil society.  
Analysis at the mesosystem level focuses attention on 
interpersonal dynamics and the dynamics between the 
individual and secondary settings, such as the workplace.97  
Analysis at the exosystem level contemplates the interactions 
outside of the primary sphere of analysis but which, 
nevertheless, affect or are affected by what happens in the 
primary setting.98  At the microsystem level, analysis is 
primarily focused on individuals and their psychological 
development in a particular context.99  The individual interacts 
within and across all four levels and consequently develops 
because of these interactions. 
Albert Bandura’s Social Learning Theory presents a 
consonant analysis.  The theory views the interaction between 
individuals and environments as a three way exchange in 
which the person, an entity with unique characteristics, 
performs a behavior in an environment which responds back to 
the person and the behavior in a process of reciprocal 
determinism; it is an idiosyncratic interaction.100  According to 
Bandura, models101 can serve to instruct, motivate, disinhibit, 
inhibit, socially facilitate, and arouse emotion in a process of 
vicarious reinforcement.102  Essentially, development is a 
process of quantitative change, during which learning episodes 
gradually accumulate over time.103  Although Social Learning 
Theory does not directly address historical or cultural context, 
it reflects the tradition of Vygotsky and the contextualist 
 96. See id.  at 258. 
 97. Id. at 209. 
 98. Id. at 237. 
 99. Id. at 56. 
 100. See ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THOUGHT AND 
ACTION: A SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY, 15 (1986); See also ALBERT BANDURA, 
SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY, 200-208 (1977); ALBERT BANDURA & R.H. 
WALTERS, ADOLESCENT AGGRESSION (1959); ALBERT BANDURA, AGGRESSION: 
SOCIAL LEARNING ANALYSIS (1973); ALBERT BANDURA, PRINCIPLES OF 
BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION (1969); PSYCHOLOGICAL MODELING: CONFLICTING 
THEORIES (Albert Bandura ed., 1971); ALBERT BANDURA & R.H. WALTERS, 
SOCIAL LEARNING AND PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT (1963); SELF-EFFICACY IN 
CHANGING SOCIETIES (Albert Bandura ed., 1995); and ALBERT BANDURA, 
SELF-EFFICACY: THE EXERCISE OF CONTROL (1997). 
 101. BANDURA, SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY, supra note 100, at 40-50. 
 102. See id. at 117–19. 
 103. Id.  
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approach.  It recognizes the dialectical process of development 
where individuals work within and are shaped by an 
environment; a triadic reciprocal determinism occurs among 
behavior, cognitive factors and the environment.104  Also, as in 
the theory of Vygotsky, there is no endpoint to development, 
and universal behaviors are rare.105  Thus, children are 
developmentally malleable but only within constraints of 
biology and environment. 
Finally, Erikson frames development through 
identification of eight stages/dichotomies of human 
development and identity formation: (1) basic trust versus 
mistrust; (2) autonomy versus shame; (3) initiative versus guilt; 
(4) industry versus inferiority; (5) identity versus role 
confusion; (6) intimacy versus isolation; (7) generativity versus 
stagnation; and (8) ego integrity versus despair.106  Erikson’s 
first three stages represent early stages when the individual is 
not yet capable of interacting with (borrowing a Vygotskian 
phrase) “cultural tools” such as the Internet.107  The eighth 
stage is similarly a stage in which the individual is primarily 
conquering internal dynamics, and, therefore, interaction with 
culture, its tools, and other individuals is not the primary focus 
of the stage.108  Conversely, in the intermediate stages, the 
individual is learning from and making a place in society.109  
The child becomes a different person in each stage with 
different cognitive capacities and progressively achieves a 
greater ability to interact with a wider range of people.110  For 
Erikson, the ego can only remain strong through interactions 
with cultural institutions that enable the development of the 
child’s capacities and potential.111 As in all nonlinear theory, 
Erikson’s stages are not bound to chronological age. 
These four schools of nonlinear developmental theory offer 
useful analytical lenses for (re)theorizing and assessing 
technology regulation. 
 104. See id. at 194–96. 
 105. Because self-beliefs play a key role in development, trajectories are 
inherently varies.  For a discussion of the role of and variations of self-beliefs 
in development see, e.g.,  ALBERT BANDURA, SELF-EFFICACY: TOWARD A 
UNIFYING THEORY OF BEHAVIORAL CHANGE (1977). 
 106. See ERIK ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 247-74 (1950). 
 107. See generally id. at 247-58. 
 108. See id. at 268. 
 109. See ERIK ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 247-74 (1950). 
 110. See id. at 258–59. 
 111. See generally id. at 190–204. 
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C.  LESSONS FROM NONLINEAR DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY FOR 
TECHNOLOGY COMMERCE 
Nonlinear developmental theory offers five concrete lessons 
for crafting successful technology regulation.  First, nonlinear 
developmental theory instructs us that human development 
and learning is always situated; the zone of proximal 
development varies across individuals.  Second, development is 
an emergent112 phenomenon.  Third, learning and development 
do not always cleanly map on to chronological age.  Fourth, 
regulating the way that humans interact with technology 
means contemplating multiple layers of context that cooperate 
or conflict to generate development.  Finally, technology is 
merely a tool that assists humans in achieving more than they 
otherwise could; the regulatory and developmental focus should 
always remain human-centric.113 
Nonlinear developmental theory reminds us of the 
importance of regulatory context or the situated learning of the 
individuals whose conduct the law tries to govern.  
Development is not something that happens to humans in a 
preordained manner; rather development is an interactive 
process that occurs on the person/society border.  Therefore, the 
society a person experiences pushes the course of his or her 
development and vice versa.  Learning and development of both 
children and adults occurs at different paces across different 
individuals, contingent in each case upon social context in the 
Vygotskian “zone of proximal development”.114  Therefore, the 
variations within the context of development must be 
considered when crafting regulatory paradigms.  The same 
biological individual in two different social contexts will arrive 
at two different developmental outcomes.  A successful 
regulatory paradigm will consider both. 
Similarly, humans exist in a particular emergent social 
context.  The social context–including the technology itself—
changes in frequently unpredictable ways.  Thus, regulating in 
 112. Emergence, generally, is order that arises from the interactions of 
individual actors within a complex system, demonstrating a global pattern 
that could not have been forecast simply from understanding the behavior of 
one particular actor. See STEVEN JOHNSON, EMERGENCE: THE CONNECTED 
LIVES OF ANTS, BRAINS, CITIES AND SOFTWARE (2001). 
 113. See supra notes 100-102. 
 114. See VYGOTSKY, supra note 85, at 187.  For more on the zone of 
proximal development, see generally RENÉ VAN DER VEER & JAAN VALSINER, 
UNDERSTANDING VYGOTSKY: A QUEST FOR SYNTHESIS 336–43 (1991). 
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a manner predicated on static assumptions about people and 
technology results in law destined for quick obsolescence.  Both 
human behavior and technology will evolve in response to law.  
Law must be capable of evolving as well. 
Nonlinear developmental theory reveals that effects on 
individuals’ development and behavior are emergent across 
multiple layers of context.115  As Bronfenbrenner’s ecological 
model asserts, a human is inherently embedded in multiple 
systemic layers that influence developmental outcomes and 
behaviors.116  It is through the convergence of these multiple 
layers of influences that development and corresponding 
behaviors arise.  Thus, a law pushing on development in the 
macrosystemic layer will influence an individual, but three 
additional layers of influence coexist in the space.  Multiple 
developmental layers must coincide in pushing in the direction 
sought by the regulation.  The influence of the exosystem of 
social norms, the mesosystem of peer groups and the economic 
exchange, and the microsystem of the individual’s current state 
of development all come into play.  Viewing the lessons of the 
model in the context of crafting effective regulation, without 
considering the impact of regulation on each of these 
interrelated layers, regulation can frequently be circumvented 
or ignored, or it may impact behavior in unanticipated and 
undesirable ways.117 
Development does not always map onto chronological age.  
An adult user whose only interactions with a software 
application occur once a week for an hour in a library on a 
shared machine experiences technology development and 
learning differently than does the ten year old child with a 
 
 116. Bronfenbrenner’s ecological model is represented as a series of 
concentric circles—or, as Bronfenbrenner characterized it, “like a set of 
Russian dolls”—with the microsystem level in the innermost circle and 
macrosystem in the outermost circle.  See BRONFENBRENNER, ECOLOGY, supra 
note 92, at 3. 
 117. For example, the CAN-SPAM Act, a macrosystem rule which aimed to 
regulate communication on the mesosystem level, lacked adequate 
macrosystem and mesosystem enforcement mechanisms.  No private right of 
action was created by the law and agencies empowered to enforce it suffer 
from limited resources.  Spammers have recognized this lack of enforcement 
and adapted to a behavior of either defiance of the law or feigned compliance.  
This feigned compliance consists of spammers including an opt-out footer at 
the bottom of emails that is not honored.  Instead it is used as a method of 
verifying that a user checks the email account.  For a discussion of spammer 
noncompliance with CAN SPAM see, e.g., Matwyshyn n.9 supra.  See also, e.g., 
BRIAN S. MCWILLIAMS, SPAM KINGS (2004). 
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laptop in her bedroom.  Technology can both equalize abilities 
and exacerbate differences.  The adult with illegible 
handwriting is as easily understandable in email as the adult 
with clear penmanship.  But, comfort with technology 
frequently maps onto number of hours spent interacting with 
computers—something driven by access to computing 
resources, which is a function of financial resources.118 
New technologies should be analyzed merely as tools in a 
Vygotskian sense.  They enable a user to accomplish more than 
the user ordinarily could without the tool.  As such, the conduct 
that arises from this assisted action is not new; it is merely 
amplified conduct.  As with any amplification, the waves of the 
conduct reach further and more potently than if the conduct 
had not been amplified.  This broader reach necessitates a 
different legislative approach.  Regulating technology creation 
is not the answer; regulating humans, their conduct, and use of 
that technology is a more promising approach. 
Finally, the broader identity development goals of the 
individual provide context for the conduct of the individual.  At 
various stages of life, developmental progress intersects with 
identity goals, creating another lens guiding individual 
behavior and developmental outcomes.  Because these identity 
goals are inherently social in nature, two layers of context push 
on the individual.  First, the context shaping development 
through interactions, and, second, the context in which the 
individual attempts to work toward identity goals.119  For 
example, when resolving the Eriksonian conflict of 
generativity120 versus stagnation, an individual may seek to 
generate something greater than herself by turning to 
technology tools such as the Internet that have previously 
influenced her development.  Technology regulation is not (and 
should not be) about regulating the creation of the technology 
 118. Several studies have demonstrated a correlation between time spent 
using computers and positive attitudes toward technology.  See, e.g., Traci L. 
Anderson, Relationships Among Internet Attitudes, Internet Use, Romantic 
Beliefs, and Perceptions of Online Romantic Relationships, 8 CYBERPSYCHOL. 
& BEHAV. 521 (2005).  Lacking access to technology, therefore, by itself creates 
disadvantage. 
 119. See supra notes 117-18. 
 120. Generativity is the concern over accomplishing a lasting impact on 
society through socially valuable work that guides the next generation of 
humanity. For a discussion of generativity see, e.g., Dan P. McAdams, R.I. 
Logan, What is generativity?, in THE GENERATIVE SOCIETY 15-31 (E. de St. 
Aubin et. al., eds.  2004). 
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itself.  Rather, technology regulation should consider humans’ 
use of tools. . 
These humans, perhaps unlike the technology itself, can 
demonstrate extreme levels of variation; however, they provide 
a more efficacious, though more complicated, point for 
regulation.  Because different environments generate different 
developmental and learning experiences, humans’ experience 
with technology varies.  For some humans, technology-
mediated contexts immediately cause consternation or 
resignation in ways that wholly real space contexts do not.  For 
other humans, however, no palpable difference exists between 
technology-mediated and real space interactions.  For still a 
third group of people, real space contexts are more likely to 
cause discomfort than virtual ones.  Technology is merely a 
tool, and, like every tool, some people are better at wielding it 
than others.  This multimodal distribution of technology 
comfort and proficiency does not map chronological age, nor is 
it absent among the regulators and judges crafting our 
technology regulation paradigms. 
Placing these five lessons in regulatory context, COPPA 
demonstrates how ignoring these five lessons of contextualist 
developmental theory can result in regulatory suboptimality. 
III. CASE STUDY: CHILDREN’S DATA SECURITY 
CONTRACTING AND THE CHILDREN’S ONLINE PRIVACY 
PROTECTION ACT 
The case study of COPPA, intended to safeguard 
information about children that websites collect for commercial 
leveraging, demonstrates the shortcomings of a legislative 
approach driven by linear assumptions about development. 
A.  LEGAL HISTORY OF COPPA 
The technology tool of the Internet has caused society to 
reconceptualize the value of user data and, consequently, the 
role that privacy and personal information control play within 
our society.121  Widespread Internet access has caused 
consumers to start to reevaluate the importance of control over 
their personal information and their children’s information.122  
Meanwhile, corporate entities have begun to place a premium 
 121. See, e.g., ROBERT O’HARROW, NO PLACE TO HIDE (2005). 
 122. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 106-74, pt. 3, at 106–07 (1999) (noting that 
“the privacy of data about personal financial information has become an 
increasingly significant concern of consumers”). 
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on consumer information, particularly in corporate 
acquisitions.123  As the technology boom hit in the late 1990’s 
and the European Union worked on adopting the EU Data 
Directive124 in member states, Congress chose to address data 
protection in a segmented fashion, starting with Internet child 
data protection and COPPA.125 
COPPA became effective in April 2000.126  COPPA requires 
that websites targeting children under the age of thirteen 
provide notice of privacy practices and obtain verifiable 
parental consent prior to collecting data from the child.127  The 
statute also empowers the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to 
promulgate additional regulations to require the operator of a 
website subject to COPPA to establish and maintain reasonable 
procedures “to protect the confidentiality, security, and 
integrity of personal information collected from children.”128  
Additionally, commentary to the promulgated regulations 
states the appropriate security measures for protecting 
children’s data include, without limitation or proscription, 
“using secure web servers and firewalls; deleting personal 
information once it is no longer being used; limiting employee 
 123. For a discussion of the transformation of user data into a marketable 
commodity, see Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1283 (2000). 
 124. Council Directive 95/46/EC, On the Protection of Individuals with 
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (E.C.). 
 125. Child Online Privacy Protection Act of 2000, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06 
(2000); see also Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 CFR Part 312 
(2006).  For a discussion of COPPA, see, for example, Gaia Bernstein, When 
New Technologies Are Still New: Windows of Opportunity for Privacy 
Protection, 51 VILL. L. REV. 921 (2005); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material 
Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, Corporate Information Security and Securities 
Regulation, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 129 (2005); Edward L. Palmer & Lisa Sofio, 
Food and Beverage Marketing to Children in School, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 33 
(2006); Marcy E. Peek, Information Privacy and Corporate Power: Towards a 
Re-Imagination of Information Privacy, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 127 (2006); 
Susan P. Stuart, Lex-Praxis of Educational Informational Privacy for Public 
Schoolchildren, 84 NEB. L. REV. 1158 (2006). 
 126. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06; see also 16 C.F.R § 312.1 (2006). Commentators 
have observed that COPPA was a reaction to the failure of self-regulation, 
particularly subsequent to the Kids.com advisory letter where the FTC set 
forth standards for privacy policies on websites targeting children. For a 
discussion of the Kids.com FTC letter, see Parry Aftab, How COPPA Came 
About, INFORMATIONWEEK, Jan. 19, 2004, 
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=17300888. 
 127. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(a)(i)–(ii) (2000). 
 128. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(D) (2000). 
MATWYSHYN A. Technology, Commerce, Development, Identity. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
2007;8(2):515-549. 
2007]  TECH., COMMERCE, DEVELOPMENT, IDENTITY 543 
                                                          
access to data and providing those employees with data-
handling training; and carefully screening the third parties to 
whom such information is disclosed.”129  COPPA leaves much 
discretion in data security to the individual website operator 
and creates no external reporting mechanism to monitor 
internal security improvements of website operators subject to 
COPPA. 130 
Specifically, COPPA stipulates that prior to collection of 
data from a child under thirteen, a website “operator”131 must 
obtain “verifiable parental consent”.132  The preferred medium 
for this verifiable parental consent is receipt of a fax from the 
parent.  An email exception133 was originally crafted as an 
interim measure to be phased out over time.  This email 
exception evolved into a “sliding scale approach” which is still 
applied by the FTC in COPPA inquiries.134  Depending on the 
character of the data collection and the intended use, the FTC’s 
analysis varies.  For example, the need to obtain verifiable 
parental consent does not  pertain equally to all child data 
gathering; the situation where a website collects data for a one-
 129. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,888, 59,906 
(Nov. 3 1999).  Sadly, this articulation of the technology specifications is 
suboptimal.  For example, the implementing regulations instruct companies to 
use “secure servers”, but servers cannot be inherently “secure” or “vulnerable.”  
Securing a server is a process that is ongoing.  Perhaps a better phraseology 
would be to have required companies to take all steps identified by a leading 
security research firm as the fundamental exercise of care in attempting to 
secure a server on an ongoing basis. 
 130. Id. However, encryption was deemed to be potentially cost prohibitive 
and left to the discretion of entities, as was the suggested use of contractual 
provisions requiring minimum standards of data care from third parties 
granted access to the collected children’s data. 
 131. Operator is broadly defined under the COPPA statute and 
implementing regulations.  They encompass anyone who meaningfully handles 
children’s data.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06 (1998); see also Children’s Online 
Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2007). 
 132. Verifiable parental consent was ideally constructed as a process 
involving e.g. faxing parental signatures to each website permitted to collect a 
child’s data. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06 (1998); see also Children’s Online 
Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.5 (2005). This process allows for easy 
circumvention as no independent means of authenticating the parental 
signature would exists. 
 133. Because of the cumbersome nature of the faxing, email verification of 
parental consent was subsequently permitted.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 
(1998); see also Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.5 
(2005).  Though this exception was originally intended to be phased out, it has 
persisted.  Email verification is susceptible to even easier child circumvention 
than fax verification. 
 134. See BNA, FTC Decides to Retain COPPA Rule With No Change After 
Review of Comments, 7 COMP. TECH. L. REP. 127 (2006). 
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time use and does not permanently connect the child with the 
information does not necessitate the same degree of consent 
verifiability.135  Additionally, a safe-harbor program exists 
where third party certificate authorities can attest compliance 
of websites with COPPA.136  The FTC is empowered to institute 
regulatory prosecutions against entities violating COPPA.  
These prosecutions result in fines and consent decrees.  
Amounts of fines have varied, with the most recent levied at 
$1,000,000 against Xanga.com, a social networking website.137  
Prior prosecutions have been few in number, and previous fines 
have not exceeded $500,000.138 
 135. See 15 U.S.C. §6501-6506 (1998); Children’s Online Privacy Protection 
Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2007).  In particular, one of the COPPA exceptions 
provides for one time collection, provided the information is subsequently 
destroyed. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06; see also Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Rule, 16 CFR § 312.  In practice, companies frequently learned how 
to live within the exceptions to the extent possible to avoid compliance. 
 136. See Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Initiative: Safe Harbor 
Program, http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/childrens_shp.html 
(last visited Apr. 11, 2007). 
 137. See United States v. Xanga.com, Inc., No. 06-CIV-682(SHS) (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 7, 2006), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623073/xangaconsentdecree.pdf.  On September 
7, 2006, the FTC and Xanga.com settled the regulatory action. Xanga.com 
acknowledged that it failed to notify parents and obtain consent before 
collecting, using, and disclosing the information of users it knew to be under 
thirteen. Despite the user agreement’s statement that children under thirteen 
could not join, children could register using a birth date showing they were 
younger than thirteen. After Xanga.com allegedly knew of their age-specific 
registration, the company failed to put in place measures to prevent collection 
of their personal information. Xanga.com also failed to notify the children’s 
parents of the company’s information practices or provide parents with access 
to and control over the information collected on their children.  Id. 
 138. See United States v. Bonzi Software, Inc., No. CV-04-1048 RJK (W.D. 
Cali., Feb. 18, 2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/bonzi/040217decreebonzi.pdf; United States v. 
UMG Recordings, Inc., No. CV-04-1050 JFW (C.D.Cali., Feb. 18, 2003) 
available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/umgrecordings/040217cagumgrecordings.pdf; 
United States v. Hershey Foods Corp., No. 4:03-CV-00350-JEJ (M.D.Pa. Feb. 
27, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/02/hersheyconsent.htm; 
United States v. Mrs. Fields Famous Brands, Inc., No. 2:03-CV-00205 (D.Utah 
Feb. 27, 2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/02/mrsfieldsconsent.htm; United States v. The Ohio 
Art Co., No. __________ (N.D.Ohio, Apr. 22, 2002), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/04/ohioartconsent.htm; United States v. Pop Corn 
Co. No. ___________ (N.D.Iowa, Feb. 14., 2002), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/02/popcorncnsnt.pdf; United States v. Lisa Frank, 
Inc., No. ______________ (E.D.Va., Oct. 2, 2001), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/10/lfconsent.pdf; United States v. Looksmart, Ltd., 
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During the first six years of its effectiveness, COPPA has 
received mixed reviews at best.  The deterrent effect of 
prosecutions appears to have been limited.  A large number of 
websites which are governed by COPPA are simply 
noncompliant and are willingly to risk prosecution rather than 
investing effort in an attempt to comply with COPPA.  As 
demonstrated by several studies, compliance is generally under 
60%,139 and even websites that attempt compliance are 
frequently easily circumvented in their age verification 
process.140 
Businesses have complained that the cost of COPPA 
compliance associated with monitoring usage, drafting privacy 
policies, and obtaining proof of parental consent runs as much 
as $200,000 per year by some estimates.141  In some cases, 
companies have deemed the costs of compliance prohibitive and 
simply ceased operations.142  For example, some websites 
removed highly interactive elements from their sites shortly 
after COPPA’s passage, alleging that compliance costs rendered 
certain lines of business unsustainable. 143 
COPPA protects the data of children who wish to have 
their data protected.144  For children who simply wish content 
access, in many instances immediate workarounds are readily 
available. Often the child merely needs to log in again and 
No. 01-606-A (E.D.Va., April 19, 2001), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/04/looksmartorder.pdf; United States v. Monarch 
Servs., Inc., et al. No. AMD 01-CV-1165 (D.Md., April 19, 2001), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/04/girlslifeorder.pdf; United States v. 
Bigmailbox.Com, Inc., et al., No. 01-605-A (E.D.Va., April 19, 2001), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/04/bigmailboxorder.pdf. 
 139. See, e.g., JOSEPH TUROW, THE ANNENBERG PUB. POLICY CTR. OF THE 
UNIV. OF PA., PRIVACY POLICIES ON CHILDREN’S WEBSITES: DO THEY PLAY BY 
THE RULES? (2001)., http://www.asc.upenn.edu/usr/jturow/PrivacyReport.pdf.  
Two studies of COPPA compliance by the University of Pennsylvania’s 
Annenburg Public Policy Center and by the Center for Media Education 
reported that although most of the sites they reviewed had privacy policies 
and limit the information collected from children, these privacy statements did 
not include required disclosures and used language that was difficult to 
understand. Id. 
 140. See, e.g., NetFamily News, Newsletter, Apr. 21, 2000, available at 
http://www.netfamilynews.org/nl000421.html. 
 141. See Ben Charny, The Cost of COPPA: Kids’ Site Stops Talking, 
ZDNET, Sep. 12, 2000, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-523848.html; Art 
Wolinsky, WiredKids,  From Safety and Privacy to Literacy and 
Empowerment, Sep., 2000, 
http://www.infotoday.com/mmschools/sep00/wolinsky.htm 
 142. Charny, supra note 141; Wolinsky, supra note 141. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See, e.g., Net Family News, supra note 140. 
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provide a false birth date to gain access to the material to 
which they were denied access.145 
As such, the business-focused crafting of the statute 
ignored the practical realities of child-technology and child-
parent interactions.  COPPA adopted a clearly linear, static 
view in addressing children’s activities online.  Its 
shortcomings result in part from this paradigm 
B.  COPPA IS NOT GROUNDED IN A NONLINEAR DEVELOPMENTAL 
THEORY 
As discussed previously, developmental psychology has 
moved toward studying individuals in a social context instead 
of focusing on decontextualized traits.  Fundamentally, 
individuals eventually internalize the intellectual life of the 
people around them, and humans create themselves and their 
cognitive development through activity.  Looking to our 
culture’s “tools”, primarily the Internet, which bridge the 
physical and social world for the child, learning is always 
situated and the zone of proximal development varies across 
individuals.  COPPA’s framework presents a static framework 
that does not take into account these nonlinear insights. 
First, COPPA presumes that parents are more 
developmentally advanced than their children regarding 
technology.  COPPA is predicated on the idea that an adult 
parent’s proficiency with technology surpasses that of her child, 
an assumption research demonstrates is unsustainable.146 
Technology learning and development do not always cleanly 
map on to chronological age.  Parents frequently feel their 
ability to monitor their children’s activities online is limited.147 
Second, the age of capacity to consent to data gathering 
stipulated in COPPA, age thirteen, appears to have been 
selected arbitrarily.  During early adolescence, large 
divergences in development are visible, perhaps even more so 
than in later life.  Even assuming a linear paradigm, since the 
issue at hand relates to data security contracting, a logical age 
of consent might mirror contractual capacity generally.  
Assuming the linear paradigm of contract law, the usual age of 
 145. Id. 
 146. See, e.g., Stefanie Olsen, Parents shaky about kids’ safety online, 
CNET NEWS.COM, Aug. 10, 2006, available at 
http://news.com.com/Parents+shaky+about+kids+safety+online/2009-1025_3-
6104028.html 
 147. Id. 
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contractual capacity is eighteen. 
Third, COPPA takes into account only one computing 
context, the home, and presumes a parent is available during 
the child’s Internet time.  However, children frequently access 
the Internet and give away information about themselves using 
computers at school, at friends’ houses, in the home when 
parents are not present, and in the library.  Therefore, a 
regulatory paradigm presuming parental presence does not 
reflect the reality of children’s situated learning in multiple 
contexts. 
Fourth, both technology use and development are emergent 
phenomena. COPPA did not take into account the norms of 
corporate conduct that would arise to circumvent its 
restrictions.  Because COPPA grants no private rights of action 
to parents, enforcement of COPPA is the sole province of the 
FTC, which is an understaffed and overburdened agency.  As 
demonstrated by widespread noncompliance, companies 
frequently run a risk-benefit calculus regarding the likelihood 
of prosecution and decide to risk regulatory action rather than 
invest in compliance structure. 
Finally, COPPA presents a technology-focused regulatory 
design; the focus is on each website that chooses to collect 
children’s data.  As technology evolves, a website-centric 
approach is destined for obsolescence.  A more promising 
regulatory design would be constructed in a human-centric 
manner focusing on the child and the child’s information.  Such 
an approach would not only demonstrate greater versatility 
and regulatory longevity, but systemic efficiencies would result 
over the current system.  In lieu of each website needing to 
institute a separate age verification process for each child, and 
each parent approving each website, a child-focused approach 
could be constructed in such a manner to allow for a single 
parental approval and a single website registration.  In this 
way, economies of scale could be created through a child data 
protection structure focused on the child rather than on the 
website operator.  Such an approach would also acknowledge 
that parents may be less knowledgeable and need more 
protection than their children, sub-optimally suited for a role of 
gatekeeper. 
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IV. THE FUTURE OF TECHNOLOGY COMMERCE 
REGULATION: NONLINEAR DEVELOPMENTAL 
PARADIGMS AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE ECONOMIC 
CYBORG 
As the example of the COPPA illustrates, lessons of 
nonlinear developmental psychology offer promising insights 
for crafting future generations of technology regulation.  The 
evolutionary nature of nonlinear developmental paradigms 
allow for the flexibility to regulate both an evolving technology 
context and an emergent developmental context for consumers. 
As consumers become more technology proficient, their use of 
technology tools will change.  Consequently, their development 
and identity formation will follow a different path from prior 
generations of consumers. 
Turning to Erikson’s insights regarding identity 
development, the dualities of industry versus inferiority, 
identity versus role confusion, intimacy versus isolation, and 
generativity versus stagnation will be resolved in new ways by 
future generations.  Successful regulation will be sensitive to 
these human dynamics.  The ability of individuals to work 
effectively, find a place in society, connect with others and 
create things outside themselves all play out through use of 
technology tools.  The future holds a world where progressively 
more individuals’ work will involve technology creation and 
use.  In our post-information revolution economy, consumer 
transactional behaviors are moving into technology-mediated 
space.  Growing numbers of people in the United States have 
Internet access,148 and online spending is increasing by 
approximately 25% annually.149  Consumer economic identity 
is increasingly characterized by a hybrid real space-virtual 
space set of economic and social behaviors; consumer spending 
through e-commerce is growing.150  Meanwhile, digital 
entrepreneurship and content creation is on the rise.  Growing 
numbers of individuals are participating in technology-
 148. See NAT’L TELECOMM. AND INFO. ADMIN., FALLING THROUGH THE NET: 
TOWARD DIGITAL INCLUSION (Oct. 2000), available at 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/fttn00/contents00.html. 
 149. See, e.g., Bloomberg News,  Online shopping jumps 25 percent from 
2005, OCREGISTER.COM, Dec. 14, 2006, 
http://www.ocregister.com/ocregister/money/article_1382582.php. 
 150. See Christopher Saunders, Consumer Confidence in Internet Grows, E-
COMMERCE-GUIDE.COM, Sept. 30, 2002, 
http://ecommerce.Internet.com/news/news/article/0,,10375_1472681,00.html. 
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mediated content creation.151  A successful technology 
regulatory regime will be sensitive to all of these emergent 
dynamics.  It will assist users in leveraging technology tools 
toward guiding their own development and viewing themselves 
as commercial cyborgs—technologically-empowered consumers 
and citizens.  This developmental evolution is critical to 
building commercial trust in the future information technology-
mediated economy. 
 151. JOHN B. HORRIGAN, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, HOME 
BROADBAND ADOPTION 2006, HOME BROADBAND ADOPTION IS GOING 
MAINSTREAM AND THAT MEANS USER-GENERATED CONTENT IS COMING FROM 
ALL KINDS OF INTERNET USERS (2006), available at 
http://www.pewInternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Broadband_trends2006.pdf. 
